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program to us.1. Introduction
China is under increasing pressure to let her currency ﬂoat. In this paper we draw
on the experience of developing countries choice of exchange rate regime and its impact
on economic performance to conjecture what may happen should China let her currency
ﬂoat.
It is commonly argued that under ﬂoating (or ﬂexible) exchange rate an economy has
a greater ability to adjust to external shocks, hence contributing to improved economic
performance (e.g. Friedman (1957), Meade (1951)), while ﬁxed or pegged exchange rate
results in price distortion and misallocation of resources. Furthermore, Calvo (1999) and
others have also argued that the need to defend a peg in the event of a negative exter-
nal shock could lead to a signiﬁcant rise in real interest rate and uncertainty as to the
substainability of the regime, hence harm investment prospects. On the other hand, ﬁxed
exchange rate or exchange rate peg contributes to predictability and macro discipline.
It could reduce relative price volatility, reduce a country’s vulnerability to speculative
exchange rate ﬂuctuations, hence lead to lower real interest rate and stronger growth per-
formance as compared to an economy under ﬂexible exchange rate. (Calvo (2000), Frankel
(1999) and Mundell (1990)). Moreover, ﬂexible exchange rate regime could amplify the
negative eﬀects of terms of trade shocks for countries where the private and public sectors
have large foreign currency-dominated liabilities. Currency depreciation generated by the
external shock could generate (large) increases in the value of the debt expressed in do-
mestic currency which might trigger bankruptcies, and resulted in a reduction in the rate
of growth.
Whether there exists a link between exchange rate regimes and growth is ultimately
an empirical issue. Ghosh (1997) ﬁnds no systematic link between the two. On the other
hand, Klein and Shambaugh (2004) show a large, signiﬁcant eﬀect of a ﬁxed exchange
rate on bilateral trade between a base country and a country that pegs to it. Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzengger (2003), Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2004) ﬁnd that less ﬂexible exchange
1rate regimes are associated with slower growth, as well as with greater output volatility
for developing countries, but do not have any signiﬁcant impact on growth for industrial
countries. Husain, Mody and Rogoﬀ (2004) ﬁnd that for relatively poor countries with
little access to international capital markets, pegged exchange rate regimes have relatively
low inﬂation and relatively high exchange rate regime durability. For advanced economics,
ﬂexible exchange rate systems yield somewhat higher growth without higher inﬂation. For
emerging markets, the exchange rate regimes does not appear to have a systematic eﬀect
on inﬂation or growth.
This paper uses a more general model speciﬁcation that encompasses those previously
speciﬁed as special cases to help resolve this dispute. We shall also rely on our parameter
estimates derived from the experience of developing counties to conjecture what might
have happened to China’s economic growth if China moves to ﬂexible exchange rate. In
section 2 we present the basic model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the
results for developing countries and uses the empirical estimates from developing counties
to conjecture what might happen to China if exchange rate regime changes. Conclusions
are in section 5.
2. The Model
A simple framework to analyze the impact of exchange rate regimes on economic
growth is to assume a baseline growth equation for country i at time t taking the form




it + δdit +  it, (2.1)
where y denotes the growth rate, x
˜
are determinants of growth such as those speciﬁed
by Levine and Renelt (1992), Barro (1991), d is the dummy for the exchange rate regime
with 1 for pegged exchange rate regime and 0 for ﬂexible exchange rate regime, and  
denotes the zero mean error term that are assumed independent of x
˜
and d. Then whether
exchange rate regime aﬀects a country’s growth conditional on x
˜
depends on the regression
estimate of δ being signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero or not.
2Model (2.1) assumes that the choice of exchange rate regime is independent of a coun-
try’s growth rate.However, choices of exchange rate regimes could be made simultaneously
with changes in macroeconomic variables. To allow for the possibility that d may be























.I fv and   are correlated, consistent estimate of δ may be obtained
by jointly estimating (2.1) - (2.3).
Equation (2.1) essentially assumes that apart from a level change (given by δ)t h e
optimal decision rules of economic agents conditional on x
˜
in an economy are invariant
under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes. It is conceivable that regime changes can lead to
modiﬁcation of the behavioral parameters because optimal decision rules vary with changes
in structures (e.g. Lucas (1976)). For instance, according to Ghosh, et.al. (1997) the in-
vestment to GDP ratio was about one percent higher in countries with pegged exchange
rates than with ﬂexible exchange rates. If behavior of economic agents stay the same con-
ditional on investment and exchange rate regime a country chose, one would expect that
other things being equal the growth rate of countries with pegged exchange rates would
be higher than countries with ﬂexible exchange rates. However, according to Ghosh et.al.
countries operating under ﬂoating rates grow about 1 percent faster compared to coun-
tries operating under pegged exchange rates. As a matter of fact, economists have argued
that although pegged exchange rates reduce policy uncertainties including exchange rate
variability, but may also exacerbate protectionist pressures. On the other hand, ﬂexible
exchange rates could lead to expectation of lower quantity violation. With changing ex-
pectations, economic agents optimal decision rules may change also. To allow for changing
3behavioral patterns under diﬀerent exchange rate regime, we assume that the baseline
growth equation for country i at time t under pegged exchange rate regime is given by
y1





it +  1
it, (2.4)
and under ﬂexible exchange rate is given by
y0





it +  0
it, (2.5)
where  1
it and  0





1 to be diﬀerent from β
˜
0, we allow the possibility that exchange rate regime changes can
fundamentally alter behavior of economic agents.
Under model (2.4) - (2.5), the eﬀect of regime changes is given by
y1
it − y0








it −  0
it).
(2.6)
However, we do not simultaneously observe y1
it and y0
it. What we do observe is
yit = dity1
it +( 1− dit)y0
it. (2.7)
If (vit,  1
it,  0
it) are correlated, then conditional on dit =1 ,
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it) are diﬀerent from zero, regressions of
(2.4) using pegged exchange rate regime data and (2.5) using ﬂexible exchange rate regime
data will give biased estimates of (α1,β
˜
1)a n d( α0,β
˜
0).
If   and v are uncorrelated
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model (2.2) - (2.5) is reduced to the commonly speciﬁed model (2.1). However, these are
testable hypotheses.
3. Data
We use panel data from 1974 - 1994 of Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon,
Chile, China, P.R.: Mainland, China, P.R.: Hong Kong, Columbia, Congo, Dem. Rep.
of Costa Rica, Cote D’Ivoire, Ecuador, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Korea, Madagas-
car, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, SRI Lanka, Tanzania,
Thailand,Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Urugay, Venezuela, Rep. Bol., Zambia, Zimbabwe.
For the growth regression, the dependent variable is annual growth rate of real per
capita GDP in US$ . The regressors we consider are: log of initial real per capita GDP in
US$, lagged by one period, measure level of economic development, a negative coeﬃcient
would support the conditional convergence hypothesis; terms of trade shock, measured
as% change in terms of trade (terms of trade is deﬁned as the ratio of export unit price
to import unit price) and their lag by one period; investment to GDP ratio, lagged by one
period; consumption — share of government consumption in GDP, lagged by one period;
openness — imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP, lagged by one period; gross —
gross private capital ﬂow as % of GDP, a measure of ﬁnancial openness, lagged by one
period; human capital as measured by primary school enrollment rate, 5-year backward
moving average to remove missing data; and secondary school enrollment rate, 5-year
backward moving average to remove missing data; and regional dummies: Asia, Africa,
5Latin America (use middle eastern countries as benchmark). The interest rate variable is
the 6-month London interbank rate (LIBOR).
For the determination of exchange rate regimes the dependent variable is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 for pegged exchange rate regime and 0 otherwise. For the
determinants, we use peg dummy lagged by one period; last period black market premium,
a measure of exchange rate misalignment, lagged by one period; terms of trade shock lag
by one period; openness deﬁned as imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP, lagged by
one period; reserves over GDP, lagged by one period; volatility of reserves, lagged by one
period, computed as the standard deviation of monthly reserves over that period’s mean
serve; lagged inﬂation rate based on CPI or GDP deﬂation in case CPI is not available;
log of real GDP in US$ , lagged by one period, measures the size of the economy; log
of lagged GDP; and lagged backward 5-year moving average of real GDP growth.
For the classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes, we shall use
a. de jure classiﬁcation by IMF: peg=1 if single currency peg or composite peg; 0
otherwise.
b. natural classiﬁcation by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2002). R&R classiﬁcation scheme
relies on a broad variety of descriptive statistics on exchange rate inﬂation, and
detailed country chronologies to group episodes into 14 ﬁne grids and 5 coarse
grids of regimes. In our study, we are not interested in treating the high inﬂation
cases separately. We therefore reclassify observations in the freely-falling category
into the other 14 categories using information on secondary classiﬁcation from the
country chronologies prepared by R&R, regardless of the inﬂation rate and the
nature of currency crisis. After the reclassiﬁcation, the peg dummy is set to one
if coarse grid takes the value of one.
c. de facto classiﬁcation by Levey-Yeyati and Sturzengger (2003) (LY&S). Using
cluster analysis, LY&S classify exchange rate regimes according to the actual
6behavior of three variables: change in nominal exchange rate, the volatility of
these changes, and the volatility of international reserves.
Most empirical studies on the choice and implication of exchange rate regimes have
used the IMF de jure classiﬁcation, which is based on the regime the country declares
to be running. However, many countries that in theory have a ﬂexible rate intervene in
exchange market so pervasively that in practice very little diﬀerence exists with countries
that have explicit ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. Conversely, periodic devaluations of pegs
in inﬂation-prone countries are the results of the implementation of monetary policies that
are inconsistent with ﬁxed exchange rates and that make the eﬀective regime resembles a
ﬂexible arrangement. Moreover, countries that appear to behave according to the declared
regime during tranquil time may be tempted to change their course of action once the
regime is under stress. Thus, a very diﬀerent picture of exchange rate regime choices may
appear once the international context becomes more volatile.
Recognizing the inadequacy of the IMF’s de jure classiﬁcation, several authors have
proposed de facto classiﬁcation schemes. Among them, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2004)
“Natural” classiﬁcation and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s (2005) de facto classiﬁcation
have been gaining popularity.
IMF classiﬁcation does not distinguish between tranquil time and crisis time. LY&S
claims they do (in a purely statistical way) by examining the absolute and relative size of
exchange rate and reserves volatility. R&R Natural classiﬁcation employs a rolling ﬁve-
year horizon to measure the true ﬂexibility of the regime. This helps distinguish between
longer-term “regimes” and shorter-term “spells” within a regime, such as the widening of
a horizontal band or a one-time devaluation followed by a re-peg. However, LY&S classi-
ﬁcation results in inconclusive results for some observations. There is also an issue when
new observations become available, would the current classiﬁcation of observations also
change? On the other hand, R&R natural classiﬁcation seeks to address the potential mis-
classiﬁcation by separating episodes of macroeconomic instability that are characterized by
7very high inﬂation rates, often reﬂected in high and frequent exchange rate depreciation,
into a “freely falling” category. Classiﬁcation of such episodes as ﬂoating, intermediate,
or pegged is problematic, since the macroeconomic disturbances could be incorrectly at-
tributed to the exchange rate regime. Freely falling episodes are typically classiﬁed under
other systems as freely ﬂoating.
Since there is no uniformly acceptable criterion for classifying exchange rate regimes,
we shall use all three classiﬁcation to see if the statistical results are sensitive to the
classiﬁcation schemes.
Data Sources of these variables are from: World Development Indicator, IMF Interna-
tional Financial Statistics, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions: various years, World Currency Yearbook: vari-
ous years, Cukierman, Alex (1992), Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence,
Cambridge, Sierman, Clemens, L.J. (1998), Politics, Institutions and the Economic Per-
formance of Nations, Edward Elgar; Cheltenham, Levy Yeyati and Sturzeneggner (2003),
“Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes: Deeds vs. Worlds”, available at www.utdt.edu/ fs-
turzen, and Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth S. Rogoﬀ (2002), “The Modern History of
Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation”, NBER working paper 8963.
4. Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of real per capital GDP growth of our data.
Table 2 presents the ordinary least squares estimates of (2.1). Table 3 presents the maxi-
mum likelihood estimates of model (2.1) - (2.3). Table 4 presents least squares estimates
of (2.4) and (2.5). Table 5 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of model (2.2) -
(2.5). Table 6 presents the results of testing model 1 ((2.1)) against model 2 ((2.1) - (2.3)),
model 1 against model 3 ((2.2) - (2.5)) and model 1 against model 3.
It is clear from these tables that the results are indeed highly sensitive to the way
exchange rate regimes are classiﬁed. However, some general pictures also appear no mat-
ter which classiﬁcation is used: First, our results appear to favor model 3 as a maintained
8hypothesis. Second, government consumption had no direct eﬀect on private productivity,
but lowered growth through the distorting eﬀects from taxation or government-expenditure
programs (e.g. Barro and Xavier (1995)). Third, we have not found evidence that terms of
trade shocks get ampliﬁed in countries that have more rigid exchange rate (e.g. Edwards
and Levy-Yegati (2003)). Fourth, political instability appears detrimental to economic
growth. Fifth, there is no evidence supporting the conditional convergence in levels of per
capital income across countries (the coeﬃcients of lagged GDP are positive in terms of
IMF classiﬁcation and are negative in terms of LY&S classiﬁcation, but neither are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. The R&R classiﬁcation yields negative and statistically insigniﬁcant
estimate for ﬂexible exchange rate regime and statistically signiﬁcant estimate for pegged
rate regime, however, its value is so unreasonable (-1.98) which leads one to doubt its
reliability).
Table 7 presents the actual growth rate of China and the predicted growth rate under
diﬀerent exchange rate regimes using China’s average values for the period, 1974-1993, or
1980-1993 or 1993. The IMF or LY&S classiﬁcation suggest that should China switch from
pegged to ﬂoating rate, China’s growth rate might be reduced by 1.5 to 2 percentage point.
On the other hand, R&R classiﬁcation suggests the reverse outcome which could lead to
an increase of growth rate by about 5 percent. However, the predicted growth rates under
pegged rate are so far oﬀ from China’s actual, the validity of this inference based on R&R
classiﬁcation is quite doubtful.
5. Conclusions
A number of developing countries have experienced currency crises with severe costs
in the past three decades. There are extensive debates about systems for achieving both
exchange rate stability and domestic price stability to prevent crises. It is often argued
that economies cannot have capital mobility, independent monetary policy, price and ex-
change rate stability simultaneously. In this paper we have developed a more complete
model speciﬁcations that encompasses speciﬁcations used in previous studies to focus on
9the impact of exchange rate regime on economic growth. Based on the experience of
developing countries, we found holding investment, openness, government consumption
constant, countries following a pegged rate rather than ﬂoating rate tend to grow 1.5 -
2 percent faster in terms of IMF and LY&S classiﬁcation but yields reverse projection in
terms of R&R classiﬁcation.
However we must caution the over-generalization of this study. Our study only focuses
on one aspect of an economy. We have not looked at many other aspects of the outcomes
associated with exchange rate regime changes such as the eﬀects of shocks (speculative
attacks) on international payments, pass-through of exchange rate changes to consumer
import prices, inﬂation, legal and judicial systems, market based disciplines, the entry
of foreign banks, capital controls, ﬁnancial liberalizations, or other aggregative activities
and their volatility. The lack of exchange rate adjustments under a peg could result in
serious price distortion and misallocation of resources. Moreover, pegs could be more
likely subject to speculative attacks, hence induce higher output volatility. Before the
1997 East Asian ﬁnancial crises, all the crises countries followed a de factor dollar-pegged
system. Government budgets were more or less balanced. Inﬂation rates were manageable.
Financial markets were buoyant for the assets of the countries in question and therefore
by major inﬂows of capital (the GDP growth rate for South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Thailand in 1996 are 7.1%, 8%, 8.6%, 5.5%, respectively, and the inﬂation rate is 4.9%,
7.9%, 3.5% and 5.9%, respectively). However, when domestic currencies became over
valued because of higher domestic inﬂation than the US and the rise of the dollar vis-´ a-vie
major industrialized currencies, notably the Japanese yen and the German duetschemark,
the weak domestic ﬁnancial system, excessive unhedged foreign borrowing by the domestic
private sector, and a lack of transparency about the ties among government, business, and
banks caused investors to abruptly changed their attitudes, leading to bouts of panic and
massive outﬂow of capital. The sudden interruption of capital ﬂows unleashed a profound
crisis in domestic ﬁnancial system and productive sectors. Floating exchange rate has
10the advantage that relevant information becomes available promptly to allow market to
operate eﬃciently and there is less chance for a country subjecting to speculative attack.
However, the cost of transition to the ﬂoating region could be high if there are serious
banking and ﬁnancial sector weakness (e.g. Summers (2000)). Given hedging instruments
such as currency futures and options are not fully available in China and China’s relative
inexperience in handling sudden large capital ﬂows and imperfect information, perhaps
instead of converting to a completely free ﬂexible exchange rate regime, a “closely managed
ﬂexible system” focusing on stabilizing RMB against a currency basket that have weights
directly proportional to the currencies of China’s major trading partners might be a more
suitable and sustainable alternative in the near future.
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13Table 1. Summary Statistics of Real Per Capita GDP Growth 
 
 
 All  IMF  R&R  LY&S  Asia Africa Latin 
American
   Fix  Flexible Fix Flexible Fix Flexible
Mean 1.17  0.91  1.41 1.31 1.11 1.09 1.23 4.11 -0.95 0.99
Media 1.98  1.55  2.26 1.82 1.95 1.71 2.00 4.20 -0.53 1.59
Minimum -17.91  -15.72  -17.91 -15.42 -17.91 -15.72 -17.91 -7.65 -17.91 -14.93
Maximum 16.90  16.90  9.91 16.90 10.69 16.90 10.86 10.81 16.90 10.86
Standard 
Deviation 
5.09 5.39 4.78 5.44 4.94 5.38 4.87 2.94 5.75 4.61
 
 Table 2.  OLS Estimation of Equation (2.1) 
 
Growth Equation 
     I M F    R & R    L Y & S  
 
Peg (Peg=1 if fixed)       .620     1.05**   1.02** 
      (.425)   (.501)   (.468) 
PCGDP(-1)      -.081   -.147   -.078 
      (.375)   (.402)   (.404) 
Terms of Trade Shock       .039***   .038***   .039*** 
      (.012)   (.012)   (.014) 
Terms of Trade Shock (-1)     .028* *   .028**   .026** 
      (.012)   (.012)   (.013) 
Investment  (-1)       .045     .024     .034 
      (.032)   (.032)   (.034) 
Government Consumption (-1)   -.164***  -.189*** -.171*** 
      (.051)   (.053)   (.056) 
Openness  (-1)       .005     .008     .009 
      (.006)   (.006)   (.006) 
LIBOR      -.147*** -.173*** -.138** 
      (.054)   (.055)   (.058) 
Secondary School Enrollment     .021     .019     .018 
      (.017)   (.017)   (.017) 
Social-Political Instability    -1.76*** -1.95*** -1.77*** 
      (.546)   (.546)   (.586) 
Legislative Effective     .018   .022   .026 
      (.020)   (.020)   (.021) 
Sub-Sahara  Africa     -3.53*** -3.95*** -4.47*** 
      (.596)   (.635)   (.696) 
Latin  American     -2.53*** -2.50*** -2.79*** 
        (.662)   (.708) (.701) 
Middle East & North Africa     -.875   -.695    -.807 
            (.805)           (.854)   (.948) 
Constant      4.14     6.95   5.64 
(2.06)   (2.20)   (2.31) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis 
       * Significant at 10% level 
     ** Significant at 5% level 
   *** Significant at 1% level Table 3.  Joint ML Estimation of Growth and Exchange Rate Regime 
Equations (2.1) – (2.3) 
 
Growth Equation 
      I M F    R & R    L Y & S  
 
Peg (Peg=1 if fixed)       2.22**   2.19**   5.23*** 
      (1.04)   (1.06)   (1.59) 
PCGDP(-1)      .273   -.115   .358 
      (.389)   (.398)   (.435) 
Terms of Trade Shock       .038***   .038***   .038*** 
      (.012)   (.012)   (.013) 
Terms of Trade Shock (-1)     .025* *   .026**   .021 
      (.012)   (.012)   (.013) 
Investment  (-1)       .039     .024     .020 
      (.032)   (.032)   (.034) 
Government Consumption (-1)   -.161***  -.187*** -.179*** 
      (.051)   (.053)   (.056) 
Openness  (-1)       .003     .008     .007 
      (.006)   (.006)   (.007) 
LIBOR      -.155*** -.169*** -.145** 
      (.053)   (.054)   (.057) 
Secondary School Enrollment     .021     .021     .023 
      (.017)   (.017)   (.016) 
Social-Political Instability    -1.29**  -1.77***  -.940 
      (.613)   (.553)   (.692) 
Legislative Effective     .023   .024   .039* 
      (.020)   (.020)   (.021) 
Sub-Sahara  Africa     -3.79*** -3.89*** -4.94*** 
      (.607)   (.629)   (.706) 
Latin  American     -2.79*** -2.45*** -3.41*** 
        (.675) (.701)   (.737) 
Middle East & North Africa     -1.17   -.789    -1.24 
            (.814)           (.847)   (.945) 
Constant      2.30     6.18   1.47 
(2.32)   (2.26)   (2.80) 
 
 
 Table 4.  OLS Estimation of Equations (2.4) and (2.5) 
  
Growth Equation --- Fixed Exchange Rate Regime 
 
      I M F    R & R    L Y & S  
 
PCGDP(-1)      .073   -2.37**  -.533 
      (.566)   (1.09)   (.742) 
Terms of Trade Shock       .027     .028     .030 
      (.017)   (.028)   (.021) 
Terms of Trade Shock (-1)     .037* *   .061**   .048** 
      (.017)   (.029)   (.022) 
Investment  (-1)       .062     .068     .093* 
      (.044)   (.072)   (.055) 
Government Consumption (-1)   -.161**  -.458***  -.289*** 
      (.073)   (.172)   (.102) 
Openness  (-1)       .0067     .092**    .030* 
      (.012)   (.036)   (.017) 
LIBOR      -.085   -.086   -.086 
      (.082)   (.124)   (.100) 
Secondary School Enrollment     .0086    .098*    .0035 
      (.030)   (.054)   (.032) 
Social-Political  Instability  -2.97**  -.798   -1.32 
      (1.22)   (2.48)   (1.43) 
Legislative  Effective    .028   -1.71**  .186 
      (.028)   (.743)   (.238) 
Sub-Sahara  Africa     -3.44*** -3.72**  -4.35*** 
      (.841)   (1.49)   (1.27) 
Latin  American     -2.63***  1.80   -2.70** 
        (.978)   (2.16) (1.32) 
Middle East & North Africa     -1.37        
      (1.27)                           
Constant      4.24     15.66   8.35 
(3.22)   (6.90)   (4.32) 
 
 Table 4.  OLS Estimation of Equations (2.4) and (2.5) 
(continue) 
  
Growth Equation --- Flexible Exchange Rate Regime 
 
      I M F    R & R    L Y & S  
 
PCGDP(-1)      .0097   .092   .367 
      (.535)   (.445)   (.484) 
Terms of Trade Shock       .063***   .048***   .045** 
      (.019)   (.014)   (.019) 
Terms of Trade Shock (-1)     .016     .021     .0066 
      (.018)   (.013)   (.017) 
Investment  (-1)       -.015     .0066     -.032 
      (.051)   (.037)   (.044) 
Government Consumption (-1)   -.233***  -.172*** -.119* 
      (.080)   (.057)   (.069) 
Openness  (-1)       .0049     .0057     .0045 
      (.0068)  (.0061)  (.0067) 
LIBOR      -.214*** -.209*** -.167** 
      (.072)   (.062)   (.072) 
Secondary School Enrollment     .029     .012     .024 
      (.022)   (.019)   (.019) 
Social-Political Instability    -1.72*** -2.05*** -1.93*** 
      (.608)   (.550)   (.620) 
Legislative Effective     .0079   .019   .025 
      (.030)   (.020)   (.020) 
Sub-Sahara  Africa     -4.96*** -3.92*** -4.73*** 
      (.958)   (.731)   (.847) 
Latin  American     -2.68*** -2.74*** -3.60*** 
        (.977)   (.799) (.837) 
Middle East & North Africa     -.751   -.936    -1.35 
            (1.11)           (.889)   (.954) 
Constant      7.32     6.32   3.97 
(2.92)   (2.37)   (2.80) 
 
 Table 5.  Endogenous Switching Regression  
Joint ML Estimation of Equations (2.2) - (2.5) 
  
Growth Equation --- Fixed Exchange Rate Regime 
 
      I M F    R & R    L Y & S  
 
PCGDP(-1)      .739   -1.98**  -.742 
      (.590)   (1.03)   (.768) 
Terms of Trade Shock       .022     .025     .022 
      (.016)   (.026)   (.019) 
Terms of Trade Shock (-1)     .028*    .061**   .039** 
      (.017)   (.027)   (.020) 
Investment  (-1)       .042     .044     .055 
      (.044)   (.069)   (.054) 
Government Consumption (-1)   -.135* -.302* -.314*** 
      (.070)   (.176)   (.094) 
Openness  (-1)       -.0075    .068**    .014 
      (.013)   (.034)   (.017) 
LIBOR      -.111   -.186   -.083 
      (.079)   (.118)   (.949) 
Secondary School Enrollment     .030     .042     .020 
      (.029)   (.051)   (.029) 
Social-Political  Instability  -1.13   -1.81   .888 
      (1.31)   (2.38)   (1.48) 
Legislative Effective     .035   -1.81***  .386** 
      (.025)   (.676)   (.192) 
Sub-Sahara  Africa     -4.13*** -3.85*** -3.90*** 
      (.818)   (1.40)   (1.22) 
Latin  American     -3.75*** 1.11    -3.53*** 
        (.973) (2.00)   (1.24) 
Middle East & North Africa     -2.64**         
      (1.24)                           
Constant      4.24     14.23   5.57 
(2.99)   (6.59)   (4.43) 
 
 Table 5.  Endogenous Switching Regression  
Joint ML Estimation of Equations (2.2) - (2.5) 
(continue) 
  
Growth Equation --- Flexible Exchange Rate Regime 
 
      I M F    R & R    L Y & S  
 
PCGDP(-1)      -.108   -.199   -.433 
      (.581)   (.437)   (.452) 
Terms of Trade Shock       .064***   .040***   .040** 
      (.019)   (.013)   (.016) 
Terms of Trade Shock (-1)     .017     .025**   .0091 
      (.018)   (.013)   (.014) 
Investment  (-1)       -.015     .034     .019 
      (.050)   (.036)   (.038) 
Government Consumption (-1)   -.231***  -.214*** -.099 
      (.079)   (.055)   (.061) 
Openness  (-1)       .0058     .0030     .0057 
      (.0069)  (.0064)  (.0074) 
LIBOR      -.211*** -.202*** -.173** 
      (.071)   (.057)   (.061) 
Secondary School Enrollment     .030     .0056    .023 
      (.021)   (.018)   (.017) 
Social-Political Instability    -1.99*** -3.10*** -3.59*** 
      (.814)   (.604)   (.718) 
Legislative Effective     .0045   .003   .010 
      (.030)   (.020)   (.017) 
Sub-Sahara  Africa     -4.92*** -4.08*** -3.25*** 
      (.940)   (.696)   (.764) 
Latin  American     -2.56*** -2.60*** -2.36*** 
        (.990) (.785)   (.773) 
Middle East & North Africa     -.627   -.538    -.694 
            (1.12)           (.818)   (.827) 
Constant      8.47     10.50   11.03 
(3.74)   (2.38)   (2.76) 
 
 
 Table 5.  Endogenous Switching Regression  
Joint ML Estimation of Equations (2.2) - (2.5) 
(continue) 
  
Exchange Rate Regime Equation 
 
      I M F    R & R    L Y & S  
 
Black Market Premium (-1)     -.00056   -0.021***   -.00090*** 
      (.00045)  (.0046)  (.00033) 
Terms of Trade Shock (ma5)     .016*     .014*     .0075 
      (.0086)  (.079)   (.0058) 
Openness  (-1)       -.0021    -0.00013    -.0046 
      (.0016)  (.0022)  (.0018) 
Inflation (-1)         -.000065   .000060   -.00026 
      (.00013) (.00039) (.00040) 
GDP  (-1)        -.392***    -.010     -.184*** 
      (.049)   (.045)   (.039) 
PCGDP  (-1)      0.0052 -.242***  -.102* 
      (.065)   (.065)   (.061) 
GDP  Growth  (ma5)    .073***  -.021   .038** 
      (.020)   (.018)   (.015) 
Reserve Volatility (-1)       -.034***   -.037***   -.0076 
      (.011)   (.014)   (.0058) 
Social-Political Instability   -.682***  -.465*** -.401*** 
      (.173)   (.166)   (.156) 
Constant      9.51   1.95   4.88 
      (.994)   (1.00)   (.797) 
 
 
Log  likelihood     -2290.34 -2104.28 -1977.34 
 Table 6. Hypothesis Testing 
 
      H0*   H0**   H0*** 
 
Model under the Null      (2.1)-(2.3) (2.2)-(2.5) (2.2)-(2.5) 
 
Model under the Alternative   (2.1)   (2.1)-(2.3)  (2.1) 
 
d.f. of the limiting chi-squared    1    14    15 
 
LR Test Statistics    IMF   1.27   22.40* 23.67* 
 
R&R   1.27   21.22* 22.49* 
 




       * Significant at 10% level 
     ** Significant at 5% level 
   *** Significant at 1% level 
 Table 7. Predicted Growth Rate of China under Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
      Average   Average    
      1974-1993   1980-1993   1993 
 
Actual  Growth  Rate    7.07    7.81    11.51 
 
Prediction  IMF  Fixed    7.48    7.66    8.03 
  IMF  Flexible  4.32    4.27    5.04 
 
 
Prediction  RR  Fixed    1.35    1.23    1.99 
  RR  Flexible    6.46    6.41    7.00 
 
Prediction  LYS  Fixed    9.16    9.27    9.75 
  LYS  Flexible   7.70    7.72    8.15 
 